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Abstract 
 The new directive of the European Parliament and the European 
Council issued in 2014 define unified expectations regarding banking 
resolution mechanism to be applied in territory of each EU member state. 
The non-euro zone member states must create national resolution funds 
while the euro zone member states have to upload the so called Single 
Resolution Fund. These funds are implemented in order to finance the 
banking resolution processes. This article introduces the main rules of the 
unified resolution system as well as deals with its financial background. The 
European Commission declared in its statement that the target level of the 
Single Resolution Fund is 55 billion euros. However, this paper provides 
evidence that this target level is underestimated.  
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Introduction 
 In order to stabile the European economic and financial processes, 
Herman Van Rompuy supposed implementation of an integrated financial 
system in 2012 which is nowadays called simply as Banking Union 
(Rompuy, H, 2012). As a realization of the recommendation, the European 
Parliament and Council approved the proposals of the European Commission 
concerning European Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2013 and in frame of 
directives the rules of banking deposit schemes as well as the rules of 
recovery and resolution of credit institutions were approved in 2014 
(European Parliament and the European Council, 2013, 2014a, 2014b). Even 
more, the Parliament and the Council also issued a regulation that defines 
uniform rules and uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions 
and certain investment firms in the euro zone (European Parliament and the 
European Council, 2014c).  
 The necessity of implementation of the single resolution mechanism 
ensuring crisis management on Union level appears also in research papers. 
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Schoenmaker proves that maintaining the financial stability, strengthening 
the financial integration and enforcing national financial policies are 
incompatible. Any two of the three could be combined but they make the 
third impossible. It is the so called financial trilemma which is observable in 
the practice: the risk of cross-border banking and investment service cannot 
be managed by national policies either the financial stability or the financial 
integration hurts (Schoenmaker, 2011). Vítor Constâncio the vice president 
of the European Central Bank highlighted in his presentation in February 
2013 the following: “The recent financial crisis demonstrated how quickly 
and powerfully problems in the financial sector of one country can spread to 
another. This is especially the case in a monetary union. As a result, 
problems in the banking sector might originate at the national level, but are 
more and more likely to affect other countries of the euro area as well, and 
may quickly threaten the stability of the entire euro area banking system” 
(Constâncio, V., 2013). In Claessens, S., Herring R. J., Schoenmaker,D., 
Summe, K. A. opinion, the national authorities make decision by taking the 
local interest into account during crisis and they do not deal with the cross-
border activity of the institution in trouble. This attitude refers also to one of 
the ingredients of the financial trilemma (Claessens, S., Herring R. J., 
Schoenmaker,D., Summe, K. A., 2010). Gros and Schoenmaker recommend 
implementing a European deposit insurance and resolution authority (Gros 
and Schoenmaker, 2014). As it will be highlighted afterwards, this proposal 
is partly realized. 
 
Rules of the resolution mechanism 
 The directive as well as the regulation of the European Parliament 
and Council brought significant changings in the process of resolution of the 
credit institutions being in critical financial situation. The directive is to be 
used in territory of each EU member state but the regulation must be applied 
only in the euro zone countries.  
 Earlier if a government intended to bail-out a financial institution 
jeopardizing the financial stability of the sovereign, the financial background 
of the rescue was provided by the tax payers. According to the new rules, 
applying the bail-in method the owners and the creditors (except for the 
owners of the covered deposits) become the payers of the resolution. Even 
more, other tools are also available for the resolution authority.  
 During the resolution process the sale of the business, usage of bridge 
institution, asset separation and the bail-in tools are available for the 
resolution authorities. These tools can be combined or applied separately.  
 When using the sale of business tool, the resolution authority has 
right to sell the shares, assets, rights and liabilities of the institution under 
resolution procedure. The purchaser must be dealt as successor.  
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 The resolution authority entitled to transfer the assets, rights, 
liabilities of the credit institution under resolution process to a bridge 
institution without consent of the shareholders. The bridge institution is 
controlled by the resolution authority.  Using this tool, the main goal is to 
maintain the critical functions of the bank and to sell the institution. When 
taking and handing over the institution, total amount of the assets has to be 
higher than the total amount of the liabilities. It can be reached by reducing 
such liabilities of the credit institution that are not covered. Doing so, the 
viability of the bridge institution is ensured. 
 The third tool that could be applied by resolution authority is the 
asset separation tool where the authority has right to hand over the assets, 
rights and liabilities of the credit institution under resolution procedure or to 
hand over the bridge institution to an asset management vehicle. While 
keeping the critical function of the credit institution is the main goal of the 
bridge institution, the price maximising is the goal of usage the asset 
separation tool. 
 By virtue of the new directive, the owners and the creditors are the 
primer payers of the resolution cost of the credit institutions. This rule is 
realized by deleting or dilution of the shares or uncovered liabilities.  
 In order to have enough own fund and liability (eligible liability), the 
credit institution should meet the minimum criteria as follows: 
𝐼𝑀 < 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑+𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑+𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠    (1) 
 where IM is the institute-specific minimal requirement. The IM has 
no predefined value. It is determined by the resolution authority and depends 
on numerous factors. When applying write down or conversion of capital 
instruments and liabilities the following sequence must be kept by the 
resolution authority:  
common equity Tier 1 items, 
additional Tier 1 items, 
Tier 2 instruments, 
subordinated debts, 
rest of eligible liabilities. 
 Suppose the resolution authority decides writing down 1135 units. 
The remaining values of the liabilities are the followings: 
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Table 1   The sequence of the write down of liabilities (fictive data) 
Liability The value of the 
liability before 
using the bail-in 
tool (unit) 
Write down 
(unit) 
Compound 
write down 
(unit) 
The value of the 
liability after using 
the bail-in tool 
(unit) 
Common equity Tier 1 
items 
465 465 465 0 
Additional Tier 1 items 204 
 
204 669 0 
Tier 2 instruments 239 239 908 0 
Subordinated debts 351 227 1135 124 
Rest of eligible 
liabilities 
6201 0 1135 6201 
Source: Fictive data 
 
 An instrument could be reduced if the liabilities being on higher rank 
in the abovementioned hierarchy have already been reduced to zero. 
Therefore, the cost of the resolution is primarily paid by the owners and such 
creditors who have receivables related to eligible liabilities of the bank under 
resolution procedure.   
 The target level of the funds is 1 % of the covered deposits that must 
be reached by the member states by the end of 2024. Member states have to 
ensure that the institutions pay contribution in order to fulfil the target level. 
The contribution is proportional. It means that the contribution of an 
institution has to be paid based on the amount of the uncovered liabilities in 
the bank compared with the uncovered liability portfolio in the member state 
in question. The highest level of uncovered liabilities the highest level of 
contribution.  
 Resolution funds must be created by non-euro zone member states 
separately and the Single Resolution Fund must be implemented by the euro 
zone member states. 
 The European Commission declared in its statement the target level 
of the Single Resolution Fund which is 55 billion euro (European 
Commission, 2014). However, this paper proves that this level is 
underestimated. The calculation is partly based on the survey made by the 
European Commission in 2013. Data disclosed by the Commission were 
provided by bank deposit guarantee schemes of the member states. Since the 
survey made by the Commission is related to the covered deposits and 
contribution to the resolution fund depends on their level (1 %) the wealth of 
the funds (in case of euro zone member states – Single Resolution Fund and 
in case of non-euro zone member states – national resolution funds) can be 
forecasted.  
 The uploading process of the Single Resolution Fund is not 
determined in the regulation but it is defined in an intergovernmental 
agreement. According to this, in the first year 40 % of the available financial 
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assets paid by the banks for resolution are to be transferred to the mutual 
resolution fund by the counterparties. In other words, 40 % of the 
contribution paid by the banks operating in the territory of a euro zone 
member state could be used for mutual resolution of an institution operating 
in other country of the euro zone. In the second year additional 20 % of the 
available sources must be transferred and after that this portion will be 
increased by 6 2/3 %. As a result of it 8 years is needed to upload the Single 
Resolution Fund.   
 Taking the result of the abovementioned survey into consideration, 
according to which the amount of the covered deposit portfolio was 
5 212 705 euro million in the euro zone at the end of 2012 and supposing 
that this amount is unchanged as well as supposing that the Single 
Resolution Fund will be uploaded by equal amounts, the following levels of 
the Fund will be available for mutual resolution in the euro zone in the 
transitional period. 
 Chart 1  
 Forecasted amount of mutual fund available for resolution of euro zone institution 
if the value of the covered deposits is unchanged 
 
Source: European Commission, own calculation 
 
 According to the chart above, uploading of the mutual fund will be 
even. If the level of the covered deposit in the euro zone did not change, the 
expected value of the total assets would be 52127 euro million by the end of 
2024 (1 % of the covered deposits). This amount would serve the operation 
of resolution mechanism.  
 In case of member states outside the euro zone, the following 
forecasted levels of national resolution funds are forecasted by the end of the 
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year 2024 if the values of the covered deposits are unchanged (data regarding 
Croatia are not available):  
Chart 2 
 Forecasted amount of national resolution funds if the value of the covered deposits 
is unchanged 
 
Source: European Commission, own calculation 
 
 When compiling the two charts above, it was assumed that data given 
for 2012 remains unchanged. However, depending on numerous factors the 
portfolio of covered deposits is continuously changing.  
 The size of the population, the level of the national GDP, the 
unemployment rate, the abroad activity of the credit institutions could have 
effect on the level of covered deposits belonging to one member state.  
 By separating the member states of the European Union as per euro 
zone member states and non-euro zone member states, strong correlation 
could be revealed between data of national GDPs and the covered deposits in 
both cases in year 2012. The correlation ratio is very high in the euro area, its 
value is 0.9728 (the minimal value of the ratio is zero and the maximum is 
1). The situation is the same in case of non-euro zone member states. The 
value of the correlation ratio is 0.9940.  
 The following chart illustrates the relationship between national 
GDPs and covered deposits belonging to the member state in question in 
case of euro area.  
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Chart 3  
 The GDP and the covered deposits of the euro zone member states in 2012  
 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, own calculation 
 
 The tight connection between national GDP and the level of the 
coverage deposits makes possible analysis of this relationship by using linear 
regression model. In both cases (euro and non-euro zone member states) the 
covered deposits are the dependent and the national GDPs are the predictor 
variables. The equilibrium of the linear regression line is  
𝑦� = 3470.742 + 0.5233𝑥    (2) 
in case of euro zone member states, and  
𝑦� = −57832.4 + 0.6112𝑥    (3) 
in case of non-euro zone member states. 
 The interpretation of (2) and (3) is the following: if the national GDP 
grows by 1 million euro, the covered deposit grows by 0.5233 million euros 
in case of euro zone member states and by 0.6112 million euros in case of 
non-euro zone member states. Therefore, if the values of GDPs are known, 
the covered deposit level could be determined by using the abovementioned 
linear regression models. Since 1 % of the covered deposit is the target level 
of the resolution fund the expected value of total assets of the funds could be 
forecasted. However the values of GDPs are not known for period 2015-
2024. In order to forecast them, in both cases (euro zone member states and 
non-euro zone member states) four scenarios were calculated as follows: 
 Name of the scenario  average GDP growth supposed  
Scenario 1   0 % 
Scenario 2   1 % 
 Scenario 3   2 % 
Scenario 4   3 % 
The following table shows the result of the calculation.  
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Table 2   
 The forecasted values of covered deposits, and forecasted total assets of resolution 
funds as for year 2024 
Data in million euro 
Sc
en
ar
io
 1
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 2
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 3
 
Sc
en
ar
io
 4
 
Covered deposit in euro zone member states 5293186 5846608 6451605 7112406 
Covered deposits in non-euro zone member 
states 
2269977 2513518 2779755 3070549 
Total assets of the Single Resolution Fund 
(euro zone member states) 
52932 58466 64516 71124 
Aggregated total assets of the national 
resolution funds (non-euro zone member states) 
22700 25135 27798 30705 
Source: own calculation 
 
Conclusion 
 Since the target level is determined as 1 % of the covered deposits in 
the resolution regulation and directive, data given in the above table show 
practically the forecasted level of the Single Resolution Fund and the 
forecasted cumulative level of the national resolution funds.  
 It is observable that the level expected by the Commission (55 billion 
euros) will be reached by a very slight growth of GDPs (in case of euro zone 
member states). However, its value will likely be significantly higher. In 
other words, the 1 % proportion of the covered deposits defined in the 
abovementioned regulations ensures significantly higher level of the Single 
Resolution Fund comparing with the expected EUR 55 billion.  
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